Methodology

We use a variety of data sources and methods to generate our trackers and reports. This page should provide information on what data sources we use and describe our data methodology.

Updates

We make changes to our methodology for a variety of reasons. This has included adding new datasets or new details, finding new ways to give faster updates, or adding new modelling. This can help us add new insights and a better understanding to how Russia is profiting from fossil fuels.

10th February 2025. We have added methodologies (Imports of third-country refined Russian crude oil and ‘Shadow’ vessel classifications) that are used across many of our reports to make it easier to reference them. These do not change how we update the counter.

Older changes

2024-06-28. We no longer track LPG exports from Russia and have removed the historical data from our charts and data. Out of Russia’s total fossil fuel exports, LPG exports make up a very small proportion. We made this decision as we would like to prioritise other areas that have more impact. We have removed the historical LPG data so we don’t mislead readers with partial data.

2024-05-10. We have fixed a bug where China’s seaborne imports of crude oil from Russia were double-counted in the tracker since November 2023 and were overestimated before November 2023. With the new data, this has reduced Russia’s exports to China by EUR 17 bln since the start of the full-scale invasion.

2023-10-19. We now use Kpler to estimate seaborne exports from Russia and other countries. This change increases our tracker’s estimate of exports from Russia to the world by EUR 77.8 bln (+18% increase) and the exports to the EU by EUR 12.4 bln (+2.8% increase).

We have also changed how we receive P&I (Protection and Indemnity) insurance information about ships to additionally attain data from known P&I providers directly as well as from Equasis. This is to make sure that we have recorded the correct start date for a ship’s insurance.Find out more details on the changes in our methodology that are explained in our post about the migration from AIS (automatic identification system) data providers to the Kpler dataset.

2022-08-01. We improved the shipment detection algorithm, leading to an increased amount of detected shipments, adding another EUR 3.5 billion to the counter.

2022-07-11. Estimates of June pipelined oil data was missing for Europe. We fixed it, adding another EUR 2.8 billion to the counter.

2022-06-26. We have included February and March 2022 trade data in our pricing model. This may have impacted prices retroactively.

2022-06-16. Two important improvements were implemented:

  • Oil leaving from Novorossiysk CPC terminal is now attributed to Kazakhstan rather than Russia;
  • Pipelined gas entering Greece from Turkey at Kipi/Kipoi transmission point is now assumed to come from Azerbaidjan rather than Russia.

Additionally, we fixed a limitation that was excluding some of the shipments that took longer than a month to reach their destination.

2022-05-13. This is a significant update, with four majour changes:

  • we have fixed a mistake that led us to overestimate pipelined gas imports from Russia (read more here);
  • we have implemented a new methodology to attribute pipelined gas to individual European countries (read more here);
  • we have added shipments loading at anchorage; and
  • we have included January 2022 trade data in our price modeling.

2022-05-04. We fixed a bug pertaining to ship IMO / MMSI correspondance. As a result, several shipments that were not accounted for before were added to the counter.

2022-04-25. We improved the shipment detection methodology, allowing us to detect more shipments than previously. The counter data has therefore increased faster than usual over the past dew days, progressively integrating previously missing shipments.

2022-03-17. We now estimate the volume of crude oil, oil product and LNG shipments based on the aggregate cargo capacity (deadweight tonnage) of ships of different types leaving Russian ports to a European Union port, extracted from MarineTraffic.com.

Definitions

G7+. Refers to the countries that have engaged in sanctions against Russia through, for example, the Price Cap Coalition: G7 countries, EU countries, and Australia.

Flows

To gather information about fossil fuel flows for different commodities, we use a variety of data sources which differ depending on commodity type, transport type, and location. The table below contains a summary of the data sources and more details are available about these data sources in the relevant sections below.

For datasets affected with a significant lag (for example, Eurostat and Customs), we assume constant flows since the latest available data.

Crude oilOil productsFossil GasLNGCoal
SeaborneKplerKplerN/AKplerKpler
Pipeline (Europe)EurostatEurostatENTSOGN/AN/A
Pipeline (Turkey)N/AN/AEurostatN/AN/A
Pipeline (China)Kpler + CustomsN/ACustomsN/AN/A

Seaborne flows

We use Kpler to track the seaborne fossil fuel exports from Russia. Kpler use a variety of sources and metrics, including historic and live AIS data, customs data, and implements their own models to estimate volumes and commodities exported on each shipment.

Kpler provide us with data regarding the exports of Russian fossil fuels in trades. A trade has a registered buyer and seller and may involve multiple ships if there is a ship-to-ship transfer of goods. A ship’s voyage may be split between multiple trades if the ship(s) load or offload at different locations.

Each trade includes details about the volume and the type of commodity.

We use the data on shipment volumes to estimate the value of the traded Russian fossil fuel, as detailed in the Pricing section below. We also collect data on ships insurance and ownership that we match to the Kpler shipment data as described in the Insurance and Ownership section below.

Pipeline Europe flows

We collect data from ENTSOG (European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas) and Eurostat for pipeline transmission in Europe. ENTSOG data tracks pipeline gas export volumes. It is available on a daily and near real-time basis. To attribute the pipeline data to each country within the pipeline network, we collect data from ENTSOG on flows between countries, at transmission interconnections for every single day. We then assume that on any given day, a country is a perfect ‘gas mixer’, that is, that all gas gets mixed before being consumed and/or re-exported. This allows us to attribute Russian gas consumption to countries that do not have direct connection with Russia. Read more about it in our post about our change in pipeline gas attribution methodology.

Pipeline Turkey flows

Pipeline gas data for Turkey is obtained from Eurostat. Projection using seasonality is applied to the latest missing months.

Pipeline China flows

Pipeline oil data for China is estimated by deducting seaborne shipments from total imports as reported by Chinese customs.

We acquire pipeline gas data between Russia and China directly from China’s customs records. Like other data sources that may experience some delay, we make the assumption of consistent gas flows based on the most recent data point available.

Pricing

Fossil fuels are sold on a variety of contracts including fixed-price, indexed to average oil prices and in other cases contracts can be indexed to other spot prices. This means that the revenue received by the exporter is not directly equal to the current spot price. To develop our tracker, we therefore rely on some assumptions. 

To estimate prices of fossil fuel trades in 2022, we first derive historical monthly average prices for imports from Russia to the EU from Eurostat, and to the rest of the world from UN Comtrade, since the trade values are indicated both in volume and monetary terms. We then fit models between these historical prices and average monthly spot prices for the current and previous months (commodity pricing includes: Brent crude oil, Title Transfer Facility gas, Newcastle steam coal, Asian LNG, Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp coal). Prices are collected from OilPrice.com, Energy Information Administration and Intercontinental Exchange; their websites models’ are built for main trading partners individually, and for the rest of the world as a whole too.

After the start of the invasion, the reluctance of many traders to take cargoes from Russia has driven discounted pricing of Russian oil. We apply the discount between Brent and Urals crude prices to crude oil exports to Europe and the discount between Brent and ESPO (Eastern Siberia–Pacific Ocean oil) to exports travelling to Asia.

From December 5, 2022 onwards, we cap the price of crude oil carried aboard tankers owned or insured in the price cap coalition countries to the level of the price cap. For information about how we get details of insurance and ownership, see the section Insurance and Ownership below.

Insurance and ownership

We use data from Equasis and insurance providers directly to identify vessel owners and P&I information, building a database of historical insurance data. For ownership, we use data available in Equasis. For insurance, first we check Equasis to identify the P&I provider and then we get the insurance start date directly from the insurance provider.

Imports of third-country refined Russian crude oil

We use data from Kpler and government sources for refinery data to estimate the value and volume of oil products made from Russian crude for export to G7+ countries from third-countries. We do not include these estimates in our counter and tracker but we use these in many of our reports.

We assume that all feedstock crude oil is perfectly mixed by refineries to produce refined oil products. For each refinery, we multiply the percentage of the feedstock crude oil that is of Russian origin to the total volume of oil products flowing out of the refinery. This allows us to attribute products as being derived from Russian crude. For example: if 30% of a refinery’s feedstock crude is of Russian origin, and the refinery exports 100 tonnes of diesel, we assume that 30 tonnes of the diesel comes from Russian origin crude.

To model the impact on imports from these refineries on Russian revenues, we first derived the value of the Russian crude being used to create products for sanctioning countries. To do this we multiplied the percentage of the refineries’ output directed to export by the total volume of their imports of Russian crude. 

Our data on each refinery’s monthly output comes from the respective countries’ government mandated monthly reports. We combined this with Kpler data on oil products exports to G7+ countries. We also use Kpler data to estimate the refineries’ imports of Russian crude oil to which we applied CREA’s pricing model for Russian crude.

‘Shadow’ vessel classifications

We define a shadow tanker as a tanker that transports Russian oil internationally with no ownership or insurance in sanctioning countries. These ‘shadow’ tankers therefore do not have to comply with the price cap.

In response to Western sanctions on Russian oil, a complex network of vessels has emerged to facilitate the continued trade of Russian crude oil and refined products. Our classification system identifies and categorises these vessels based on ownership, insurance, flags, and operational patterns. By defining different types of ‘shadow’ vessels, we aim to provide clarity on how Russian oil is being transported outside of sanction-compliant channels. This classification helps track trends, assess risks, and understand the evolving strategies used to sustain Russia’s oil exports despite international sanctions. Where a vessel falls into multiple categories, we prioritise the classification which is higher in the list.

G7+ associated vessel. A vessel that is owned, flagged, or insured in G7+ countries.

Taxi ‘shadow’ vessel. A vessel has shipped non-Russian oil at least once every quarter.

Russian hub ‘shadow’ vessel. A vessel that conducted half of its annual voyages using ship-to-ship (STS) transfers.

Russian core ‘shadow’ vessel. A vessel, since the imposition of Western sanctions on Russian oil, that makes at least one voyage per quarter with Russian oil. Additionally, a vessel that has changed ownership or insurance and has made at least one voyage per quarter with Russian oil for at least one year.

Russian developing ‘shadow’ vessel. A vessel that makes at least one voyage per quarter with Russian oil since changing ownership or insurance within the past year.

Other ‘shadow’ vessel. Any other vessel that does not fit into any of the above categories.

References